

Message Text

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70/72

ACTION IO-14

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NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 DRC-01 /168 W

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R 141542Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4550

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

USMISSION GENEVA

USUN NEW YORK 2659

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 5291

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFO OMITTED)

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, IAEA, IN

SUBJECT: IAEA BOARD DEBATE ON INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

REF: (A) IAEA VIENNA 5191 (B) IAEA VIENNA 5233 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: PAKISTAN SAID IT HAD DETECTED RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS
FROM MAY 18 INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND THEREFORE INDIA HAD
VIOLATED LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY. PAKISTAN PLANNING INFORM LTBT
DEPOSITARIES. INDIA REPEATED ERLIER ASSERTIONS EXPLOSION
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COMPLETELY CONTAINED AND DENIED VIOLATION OF ANY INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENT. CANADA POINTED OUT IT DIFFERED WITH INDIA ON INTERPRETATION 1956 BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT. INDIA MADE NO REPLY TO REMARKS BY US, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND FRG ON NEED TO PREVENT SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY. JAPAN SAID IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MUST NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH PROLIFERATION. CANADA, DENMARK, FRG, AND SWEDEN URGED INDIA PLACE ALL ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS, TO WHICH INDIA REPLIED IT WOULD WHEN ALL STATES HAD DONE SO WITH BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY NUCLEAR FACILITIES. AUSTRALIA AND DEMANRK RUGED PROGRESS ON CTB. UK AND USSR RE-AFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR NPT. END SUMMARY.

1. IAEA BOARD ADJOURNED ITS JUNE MEETING JUNE 13 AFTER 90-MINUTE RELATIVELY LOW-KEY DEBATE ON INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION (INE) IN WHICH ONLY NOTE OF SHARPNESS OCCURRED IN EXCHANGES BETWEEN INDIAN AND CANADIAN AMBASSADORS.

2. PAKISTANI AEC CHAIRMAN KHAN LED OFF WITH STATEMENT CLOSELY FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM HE HAD SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF HIS REQUEST THAT ITEM BE PLACED ON AGENCY (REF A). HE SAID CLAIM THAT INE FOR PURELY PEACEFUL PURPOSES HAD LITTLE CREDIBILITY FOR MAY STATES. REAL INTENT UNCERTAIN AND DOUBTFUL. NPT AND TLATELOLCO PROVIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF PNES; IF INE REALLY PEACEFUL, WHY SECRECY? RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS FROM EXPLOSION HAD CROSSED FRONTIER AND BEEN DETECTED IN PAKISTAN. THEREFORE INDIA IN VIOLATION LTBT AND PAKISTAN PLANNING CONVEY THIS INFORMATION FORMALLY TO DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS.

3. PAKISTANI ASKED IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL IF ANY FACILITY SAFEGUARDED BY IAEA WAS INVOLVED IN PARODUCTION PLUTONIUM FOR INDIAN DEVICE, IF EXPLOSION WILL IN ANY WAY AFFECT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS OR PROCEDURES IN INDIA, AND IF THERE ARE ANY PROVISIONS IN SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD TERMINATE SAFEGUARDS ON ANY INDIAN FACILITY AFTER CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME. (COMMENT: THIS IS REFERENCE TO AGREEMENTS COVERING CANADIAN-SUPPLIED POWER REACTORS. DG DID NOT ANSWER ANY OF QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM DURING DEBATE, ALTHOUGH HE MAY DO SO AT SEPTEMBER BOARD MEETING.) PAKISTAN SAID THAT WHEN MEMBER STATE HAS ADVANCED TO POINT WHERE IT AMONG SIX COUNTRIES CAPABLE OF EXPLODING NUCLEAR WEAPON, QUESTION ARISES WHETHER IT ELIGIBLE FOR IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

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4. PAKISTANI QUOTED 1972 BHUTTO STATEMENT FAVORING NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ON SUBCONTINENT AND SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE UNTIL DIFFERENT KIND OF MESSAGE RECEIVED MAY 18. HE SAID IAE MIGHT HAVE TO RECONSIDER WHETHER SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES WOULD EXPAND AS RAPIDLY AS IT HAD ANTICIPATED, AND SUGGESTED IT WAID UNTIL AFTER NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE TO SEE WHETHER REVIEW INDICATED EXPANSION JUSTIFIED. PAKISTAN BELIEVES IN NON-PROLIFERATION,

NOT SELECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION. ANY EFFORT LET ONE OR TWO INTO NUCLEAR CLUB WILL FAIL. PAKISTAN WAITING TO SEE WHAT SUPER-POWERS WILL DO.

5. SWEDEN QUOTED EARLIER PALME STATEMENT AND SAID IT WOULD WELCOME INITIATIVE BY INDIA TO PUT ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

6. FRG (LOOSCH) SAID ONE OF DEEP CONCERN. EXPLOSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. OTHERS COULD FOLLOW INDIAN EXAMPLE; FRG THEREFORE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO REACTION OF THREE NPT DEPOSITARY POWERS. FRG BELIEVES THOSE POWERS HAVE PERHAPS FOCUSED TOO MUCH ON WESTERN EUROPE IN THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. EACH HAS SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA - FRIENDSHIP TREATY, PROVISION OF CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, OR COMMONWEALTH TIES - AND FRG WOULD LIKE KNOW WHAT STEPS THEY TOOK TO PERSUADE INDIA NOT CARRY OUT EXPLOSION OR AT LEAST HAVE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION. HE HOPED INDIA WOULD PLACE ALL ITS ACTIVITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS AND WOULD JOIN IN PREVENTING FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY (NET). THIS IN LINE WITH FRG HOPE TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE COOPERATION WITH INDIA IN NUCLEAR FIELD. HE NOTED FRG HAD RATIFIED NPT, WOULD BRING IT INTO FORCE JOINTLY WITH EC PARTNERS, AND HOPED OTHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD DO LIKEWISE.

7. CANADA (BEESLEY) ALSO NOTED TECHNOLOGY OF PNEs AND MNEs INDISTINGUISHABLE AND RECALLED VIEWS EXPRESSED IN 1971 TRUDEAU-GANDHI LETTER. IT QUOTE INTERPRETS ITS NPT OBLIGATIONS AS PRECLUDING IT FROM MAKING AVAILABLE TO NON-PARTIES NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR ENGINEERING SERVICES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IN ABSENCE OF UNDERTAKING PRECLUDING SUCH USE. THIS IS, OF COURSE, FULLY IN KEEPING WITH IAEA UNCLASSIFIED

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SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM UNQUOTE. CONCERNING IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, CANADA THOUGHT IT SHOULD GO TO MOST NEEDY COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE JUST BEGINNING NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS. (COMMENT: THIS OF COURSE EXCLUDES PAKISTAN AS WELL AS INDIA.) HE CONCLUDED BY PRESSING INDIA FOR ANSWER TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO PLACE ALL FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS.

8. DENMARK ALSO SAID ONE GAVE IT GREAT CONCERN AND IT SUPPORTED SWEDISH REQUEST. UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN NPT OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND CTB WHICH WILL APPLY TO ALL UNDERGROUND TESTS IS NECESSARY.

9. AUSTRALIA (AEC CHAIRMAN BOSWELL) QUOTED FORNMIN'S MAY 21 STATEMENT, URGED ALL STATES ADHERE TO NPT, AND SAID IT IMPORTANT NO FURTHER EXPLOSIONS OCCUR

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 SCI-06

OMB-01 FEA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 DRC-01 /168 W

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R 141542Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4551

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

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OUTSIDE NPT FRAMEWORK. AUSTRILIA WOULD WELCOME AFFIRMATIONS FROM NON-PARTIES THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND WILL NOT ENCOURAGE OR ASSIST OTHER COUNTRIES IN CARRYING THEM OUT. THERE IS NEED TO REVIEW INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PREVENTING SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGY THAT COULD LEAD TO PROLIFERATION. IN VIEW GRAVE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION, AUSTRALIA URGED EVEN GREATER EFFORTS TOWARD CTB.

10. UK RESREP QUOTED MAY 24 STATEMENT BY ENNOLS AND SAID UK WILL WANT TO CONSIDER WAYS IN WHICH DANGERS

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INHERENT IN PROLIFERATION OF NET CAN BE CONTAINED.
INE HAS INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF NPT AND OF 1975 REVIEW
CONFERENCE.

11. JAPAN SAID ITS POLICY IS NOT RPT NOT TO CONDUCT
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR ANY PURPOSE AND IT FEELS
OBLIGED ENSURE THAT ITS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NOT
CONTRADICT THIS NATIONAL POLICY. JAPAN GIVING
\$259,000 TO IAEA IN 1974 AND JAPAN WOULD FIND ITSELF
IN CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IF ANY OF THIS ASSISTANCE
TURNED OUT TO HAVE ASSISTED PROLIFERATION OF NET.
IT DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT IAEA
ASSISTANCE DOES NOT IN FACT CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT
OF NUCLEAR WEAPON OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

12. IRELAND SAID NEWS RECEIVED THERE WITH DISTRESS.
HOWEVER, IT NOTED EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY INDIA AND
WOULD LIKE TO REMIND NUCLEAR POWERS OF THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES.

13. US (AMBASSADOR TAPE) REMINDED BOARD OF HIS
STATEMENT PREVIOUS DAY (STATE 122766) AND REPEATED
MAIN POINTS. HE RECALLED US PARTICIPATION AND
COOPERATION WITH IAEA MEETINGS ON MAKING BENEFITS
OF PNES AVAILABLE TO NNWS. HE ALSO RECALLED OUR
STATEMENTS THAT SUPPLY OF ENRICHMENT SERVICES TO MEXICO
AND YUGOSLAVIA FACILITATED BY THEIR NPT STATUS AND
THAT NPT PARTIES WOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY IN 1974
AND SUBSEQUENT GIFTS OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
(SEPTEL). HE SAID US ALSO WISHED DG'S ASSURANCE
THAT NONE OF MATERIALS COVERED BY SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENTS TO WHICH US PARTY HAD BEEN USED IN INE.
IN US VIEW MECHANISM FOR PREVENTING EXPORT OF NET
IS OF PARAMOUNT CONCERN. US TAKES ITS NPT
RESPONSIBILITIES SERIOUSLY AND WILL TAKE THEM
SERIOUSLY IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF NEXT STEPS.

14. USSR (ARKADIEV) SAID IT STANDS STRICTLY BEHIND
NPT, VERY IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL TREATY WHICH TO
VERY GREAT EXTENT ENSURES WORLD PEACE. POLICY OF
SOVIET UNION WITH RESPECT TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND INDEED DESTRUCTION AND PROHIBITION OF

MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR.

15. INDIA (AMBASSADOR JAIPAL) SAID ITS EXPERTS FLEW WITHIN 250 METERS OF EXPLOSION IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS AND FOUND QTE ZERO UNQTE REAIOACTIVITY. THEREFORE INDIA NOT VIOLATED LTBT IN ANY WAY. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS USED WERE NOT UNDER INTERNATIONAL OR BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS. DEVICE WAS FABRICATED BY INDIANS WITH NO FOREIGN HELP. EXPLOSION SHOULD NOT HAVE COME AS SURPRISE, RECALLING AUGUST 2, 1972 AND NOVEMBER 15, 1973 STATEMENTS IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT THAT QTE UNDERGROUND TESTS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WILL BE UNDERTAKEN UNQTE. INDIA NOT PARTY TO NPT FOR REASONS OF PRINCIPLE, BUT HAS NEVER CAMPAIGNED AGAINST IT. INDIA OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEREFORE TO THEIR PROLIFERATION. INDIA DOES NOT RPT NOT INTEND MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HAD THIS POLICY LONG BEFORE NPT. THEREFORE FALSE SAY THAT INE HARMS NPT. BUT INDIA HAS ALWAYS RESERVED RIGHT PURSUE ITS OWN INDEPENDENT POLICY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AND UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PART OF THAT POLICY. GOI NOT ALONE IN BELIEVING PNES OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT, NOTING EXPLOSIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES ORIENTED TOWARD STIMULATION OF GAS AND OIL PRODUCTION AND QUOTING GLEN SEABORG ON SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY OF PNES. ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO HOLDING OWN PNES IS "TO INVITE FOREIGNERS INTO OUR COUNTRY TO EXPLOIT OUR OWN NATURAL RESOURCES WITH THEIR NUCLEAR DEVICES. THIS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO INDIA."

16. WITH REGARD TO TA, IAEA ASSISTANCE IS GIVEN WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION IN AREAS OF REAL NEED. INDIA IS BOTH RECIPIENT AND DONOR OF TA. AS TO WHETHER INDIA WILL PLACE ALL ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS, IT WILL CONSIDER THIS POLICY WHEN ALL IAEA MEMBERS, AND OTHERS OUTSIDE IAEA, PLACE ALL THEIR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY, UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

17. IN REPLY, CANADA NOTED IT HAD DIFFERENT UNCLASSIFIED

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INTERPRETATION THAN DID INDIA OF 1956 BILATERAL. JAIPAL'S EXPLANATION NOT CONSISTENT WITH CANADA'S INTERPRETATION. AS FOR PLACING FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS, JAIPAL'S STATEMENT PLACED INDIA IN SAME CATEGORY AS NWS. INDIA SHOULD NOT RPT NOT APPLY SAME STANDARDS TO ITSELF AS DID NWS; TO DO SO CALLED INTO QUESTION CREDIBILITY OF ITS PEACEFUL ASSURANCES. HE NOTED JAIPAL HAD NOT REPLIED TO QUESTIONS ABOUT NET

PROLIFERATION AND SAID HE HOPED PURSUE QUESTION ON
ANOTHER OCCASION.

18. AMBASSADOR JAIPAL ENDED DEBATE BY SAYING INDIA
DOES NOT BELONG TO ANY CLUB AND DOESN'T WISH TO BE
ASSOCIATED WITH NWS IN ANY SENSE. INDIA DOES NOT
INTEND MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CANADA CAN
INTERPRET THAT AS IT LIKES. TAPE

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